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Productivity, Discrimination, and Lost Profits
During Baseball’s Integration
JONATHAN A. LANNING
This article uses data from Major League Baseball’s integration to identify the
sources and magnitude of labor market discrimination. Returns to hiring black
workers in this industry were high, and the industry’s labor supply was uniquely
suited for rapid integration, yet integration evolved slowly. Many explanations
for this sluggishness are considered, including both taste-based and statistical
discrimination. Ultimately, only owner and collective coworker discrimination
can explain baseball’s slow pace of integration. The estimated levels of
discrimination are high, showing the median team sacrificed profits of nearly $2.2
million in 1950 dollars (over $19 million 2010 dollars) by delaying integration.

M

ajor League Baseball’s 1947 integration was a pivotal event in
America’s movement away from racial segregation. Though some
large industries had integrated prior to baseball, these earlier integrations
were generally inconspicuous. 1 For example, the Ford Motor Company
appeared to be well-integrated by the 1920’s, but due to high levels of
internal segregation, few inside Ford (and even fewer outside of Detroit)
could appreciate the diverse racial composition of Ford employees. 2 A
more public event was the establishment of the Fair Employment Practice
Commission during World War II, yet the actual impacts and efficacy
the integrations sparked were not transparent to the public. 3 While these
earlier integrations were no doubt important, the American workplace, and
society at large, remained largely segregated in 1947.
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1
For examples, see Higgs, “Firm-Specific Evidence”; Collins “Race”; and Foote, Whatley, and
Wright, “Arbitraging.”
2
Maloney and Whatley, “Making the Effort.”
3
Collins, “Race.”
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Three years prior to baseball’s integration, Gunnar Myrdal suggested
a solution to this persistent segregation. In An American Dilemma, he
concluded that that “more public events” were essential to overcoming
“white indifference,” and in fact that “publicity is of the highest
strategic importance” for racial equality.4 Unlike earlier integrations,
Major League Baseball’s prominence made its integration a truly public
event that could meet Myrdal’s charge. More than 18.5 million
consumers attended Major League baseball games in 1947, with many
millions more attending games in other leagues.5 Even outside of Major
League cities, most every newspaper dedicated numerous daily columninches to baseball, and nearly every major news outlet covered
baseball’s integration.6 Baseball’s integration also reached from sports
into popular culture—for example, a song about Jackie Robinson (the
man who integrated baseball in 1947) reached as high as #13 on
national radio charts. In fact, prior to Brown v. The Board of Education
of Topeka, baseball’s integration was an issue of “even greater salience”
than school desegregation in the fight for Civil Rights.7 Through
baseball, a nation would bear direct witness to the success or failure of
an institution’s integration.
The importance of baseball’s integration may be best measured
by the impact it had on future integration efforts. Baseball
integrated in 1947, a year before President Truman integrated the armed
forces, seven years before the Brown case, and 17 years before the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Baseball was also a catalyst for these subsequent
“public” integrations.8 Long before efforts to integrate other public
spaces could be considered, “dozens of minor league baseball
teams, even in places like Montgomery [Alabama] and Durham [North
Carolina], signed their first black players.”9 Even strongholds of
segregation were accepting of baseball’s integration as an initial step
toward integration; Birmingham, Alabama willingly repealed its ban on
interracial sporting competitions in an attempt to get the Dodgers to
visit during spring training in 1954.10 Baseball provided such a lasting
4

Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 48.
Lanctot, Negro League Baseball.
6
Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment.
7
Klarman, Jim Crow, p. 186.
8
For example, two of the more important Supreme Court cases leading up to Brown, Sweatt
v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, were so inconsistent with previous rulings
that they “are best explained in terms of social and political change; by 1950 major league
baseball had been desegregated for three years, a salient and important development for several
of the justices, who were huge fans” (Klarman, Jim Crow, p. 209).
9
Ibid., p. 388.
10
Ibid., p. 393.
5
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icon of desegregation that decades later “the Jackie Robinson story was
used repeatedly as a metaphor during integration of the southern textile
industry.”11
Civil Rights leaders were also keenly aware of baseball’s
importance, and Robinson’s contributions. In particular, Martin Luther
King Jr. poignantly captured Robinson’s importance to the Civil
Rights Movement, stating “back in the days when integration wasn’t
fashionable, he underwent the trauma and the humiliation and the
loneliness which comes with being a pilgrim walking the lonesome
byways toward the high road of Freedom. He was a sit-inner before the
sit-ins, a freedom rider before the Freedom Rides.”12 This national
salience made baseball’s integration a “great experiment,” both socially
and economically. As such, baseball’s integration served as something of
an integration litmus test for the nation, one that garnered a great deal
more public attention than most any prior industry’s integration.
In addition to its historical importance, the integration of Major
League Baseball also provided excellent data that make it an ideal case
study of the market discrimination at play in this era. The integration of
the first Major League Baseball team was abrupt, public, and absent the
governmental involvement that affected the integration patterns in many
previous case studies of integration.13 This allows for a “clean” analysis
of the market forces working for and against integration. The slow
and public nature of baseball’s integration provides excellent data
on both individual- and firm-level productivity. These data allow for
unique analysis into the sources and magnitudes of the economic
discrimination that affected baseball’s integration.
But despite its unique positioning, relatively little economic analysis
has been performed on baseball’s integration.14 And while many papers
document evidence of discrimination in sports, most have focused
on customer discrimination, and none have attempted to disentangle
the multiple potential sources or motivations behind discrimination.15
11
Minchin, Hiring the Black Worker, p. 294. See Heckman and Payner, “Determining the
Impact,” for an argument that the southern textile industry’s integration was of particular
economic importance.
12
King, “Hall of Famer.”
13
For example, see Heckman and Payner, “Determining the Impact.”
14
Notable exceptions are Gwartney and Haworth, “Employer Costs”; Hanssen, “Cost of
Discrimination”; and Goff, McCormick, and Tollison, “Integration.” Each of these document
evidence of some type of economic discrimination based on team performance—however none of
these studies used any measure of individual-level productivity.
15
Some papers have attempted to identify types of economic discrimination using data from
markets indirectly connected to race, such as the market for memorabilia (e.g., Nardinelli and
Simon, “Discrimination”; and Andersen and LaCroix, “Customer Racial Discrimination” ) or from
nonmarket sources such as game shows (e.g., Levitt, “Testing Theories of Discrimination”; and
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Since this article uses a rich data set that includes individual- and
firm-level productivity measures from an actual market, I am better
able to identify the sources of economic discrimination surrounding
baseball’s integration.
Ultimately, I find that the median team sacrificed profits of nearly
$2.2 million in 1950 dollars (more than $19 million in 2010 dollars)
by remaining segregated. I then show that the incentives to integrate
should have been clear by 1950, and identify the most likely reason
for the delay of integration as owner hesitancy based on their own
discrimination or collective discrimination by their players.
A Brief History of Baseball’s Segregation and Integration
Major League baseball first integrated in 1884, when the integrated
Toledo Blue Stockings joined the Major Leagues; but this period of
integration was short-lived.16 After the 1884 season, white professional
baseball adopted a “gentlemen’s agreement” discouraging any teams
from hiring black players. The strength of this rule was bolstered
by many prominent players claiming that they would refuse to play for
or against “any team with colored players.”17 At this time the Major
Leagues and the franchises they comprised were very much in flux, and
the loss of a prominent star could well have caused irreparable damage
to a team’s reputation and financial success.18 Whether this threat was
a reason or an excuse for segregation, the “gentlemen’s agreement”
effectively barred black players from the Major Leagues in 1884; by
1898 every minor league had adopted a similar policy.19
In response to the “gentlemen’s agreement,” entrepreneurs began
founding leagues composed of players excluded from the Major
Leagues based on race. While many of these leagues were small
and financially unviable, even at the outset they comprised a great
deal of talent.20 The nature of the Negro Leagues changed in 1920
when Andrew “Rube” Foster founded the Negro National League,
and the “major” Negro Leagues were born. 21 These leagues were
Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh, “Games”). Other studies document discrimination in other
sports; Kahn, “Discrimination in Professional Sports,” offers a thorough survey of this literature.
16
Ribowski, History of the Negro Leagues.
17
Ward and Burns, Baseball.
18
However, Cap Anson—the most vocal player in opposition to integration—played against
integrated teams when faced with the choice of playing or forfeiting his game check. See Ward
and Burns, Baseball.
19
Ibid.
20
Ribowski, History of the Negro Leagues; and White, Colored Base Ball.
21
Ribowski, History of the Negro Leagues.
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well-organized, well-advertised, played in most Major League
cities, and even in many Major League stadiums. 22 They drew
large crowds, were financially relevant, and displayed a product of
comparable, and in some cases higher, quality than the all-white
leagues. Given the attendance, publicity, and quality of the Negro
Leagues, the owners or customers of white Major League franchises
were likely well-aware of the talent available to a team willing to
break the “gentlemen’s agreement.”
In October 1945 Robinson signed a minor league contract with
the Brooklyn Dodgers. After integrating the minor leagues in 1946,
Robinson took the field for Brooklyn on 15 April 1947 and became
the first black man to play Major League baseball in 63 years. The
on-field returns were immediate: Robinson won the Rookie of the Year
Award and finished third in the league’s Most Valuable Player
balloting. Robinson’s success was not unique: three of the first five
former Negro League players to play in the white Major Leagues would
eventually be elected to the Hall of Fame, and despite their sparse
numbers and relative short time horizon, former Negro League players
would be comprise one-sixth of Major League Baseball’s “All-Century
Team.”23
Some franchises quickly followed the Dodger’s lead and integrated.
Table 1 shows the years when each Major League franchise reached
some key integration landmarks. But by 1950, long after the potential
returns to integration should have been apparent, 12 of the 16 Major
League teams had still failed to integrate. It would take until 1965
before every team had employed at least one full-time black player.
Data
The data used for this analysis include Major League team-level
data on productivity, individual-level data on the Major League and
“pre-market” productivity of all former Negro League players who
participated in the Major Leagues, and similar individual-level data
for all white players who made their Major League debuts between
1950 and 1953. Individual-level data include an assortment of measures
of Major League productivity, as well as pre-market indicators

22

Lanctot, Negro League Baseball.
Among the first five integrators, Jackie Robinson, Larry Doby, and Roy Campenella are
members of the Major League Baseball Hall of Fame. The relevant members of the “All
Century Team” are Hank Aaron, Ernie Banks, Bob Gibson, Willie Mays, and Jackie Robinson.
Mays and Aaron were among the top five vote recipients.
23
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TABLE 1
YEARS OF INTEGRATION FOR MAJOR LEAGUE FRANCHISES

Team
Brooklyn Dodgers
Cleveland Indians
St. Louis Browns
New York Giants
Boston Braves
Chicago White Sox
Philadelphia Athletics
Chicago Cubs
Pittsburgh Pirates
St. Louis Cardinals
Cincinnati Reds
Washington Senators
New York Yankees
Philadelphia Phillies
Detroit Tigers
Boston Red Sox

Major League
Integration
1947
1947
1947
1949
1950
1951
1953
1953
1954
1954
1954
1954
1955
1957
1958
1959

First Negro
Minor League Leaguer in Major
Integration
Leagues
1945
1947
1947
1949
1948
1950
1951
1949
1951
1953
1952
1951
1949
1952
1953
1949

1947
1947
1947
1949
1950
1951
1954
1953
1954
1956
1954
—
1955
1957
1959
1961

First Full-Time
Player in Major
Leagues
1947
1948
1956
1949
1950
1951
1954
1955
1954
1958
1956
1955
1959
1960
1961
1965

Notes: Teams are sorted in order of Major League integration.
Sources: Major and Minor League Black Signings are from Lanctot, Negro League Baseball;
First Negro Leaguer in Major Leagues is from Clark and Lester, Negro Leagues; and Black
Full-Time Players are from Hanssen, “Cost of Discrimination.”

potentially relevant for the prediction of this Major League productivity.
The team-level data is a constructed panel of all 16 Major League
teams over the 16 years inclusive of 1946–1961.24 These team-level
data include measures of each team’s performance, attendance, and
the demographic characteristics of their cities. Additional data on
team finances were also collected from the 1951 and 1957 hearings
conducted by the House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary
Inquiry into Organized Professional Team Sports. These data include
profits and losses for all Major League franchises from 1920–1950, as
well as somewhat more detailed revenue and cost breakdowns for the
years 1946, 1950, and 1952–1956.
As noted earlier, measures of an individual’s productivity are rare,
but key to assessing economic discrimination. Since such measures
have not been used in previous economic studies of baseball’s
integration, they have not been able to identify the sources of economic
24

Pre-1946 data are not used. As most of the regular professional players were away serving
in World War II, earlier data offer little information on the postwar trends or quality of teams
and leagues.
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discrimination. In this analysis, Expected Runs Produced (ERP)
per At Bat is used to measure a player’s productivity. ERP is a simple
linear transformation of individual performance measures that yields the
expected team runs resulting from a player’s efforts.25 ERP can also
be aggregated to the team level and is highly accurate at predicting the
total runs scored by a team in larger samples.26 More importantly, ERP
is very effective at predicting the output for high-productivity players
and teams. This property makes it ideal for this analysis as many of
the former Negro League players and their teams were well above
average in their production.27 A limitation of ERP is that it only reflects
the contribution of batting with no evaluation of a player’s defense or
pitching.28 As there were very few black pitchers given the opportunity
to perform at the Major League level, this study focuses only on
positional players. That the barriers facing black pitchers appear to
have been higher than those faced by black positional players is an
interesting topic in its own right, and could imply a form of “color line”
discrimination not explored here.29
I measure a team’s integration in two ways: a simple binary
variable indicating whether the team employed a former Negro League
player, and the proportion of a team’s at bats that went to former
Negro League players. The measures allow flexibility in identifying the
response to hiring the first and subsequent Negro League players, while
also measuring the extent to which the players contributed to the team.30
One concern with these data is the possibility that there might
be systematic endogenous selection into integration. This presents a
problem if the teams that integrated early were systematically “better”
than those that resisted integration, an effect that might lead to inflated
25
The specific calculation of ERP is ERP = .16 * (3 * singles + 5 * doubles + 7 * triples + 9 *
homeruns + 2 * walks + stolen bases − .61 * outs made).
26
Johnson, “Estimated Runs Produced.”
27
Substituting other measures of productivity such as Runs Created, Wins Above Replacement
Player, and On Base plus Slugging Percentage does not impact the relative size or statistical
significance of the results.
28
Former Negro League players were often asked to play new “lower value” positions, but
did so very well according to most metrics (see James, Win Shares). As such, omitting defensive
value may well reduce the estimated benefits of integration.
29
Scully, “Discrimination,” offers some analysis of this issue, finding that attendance at
games started by black pitchers was lower than games started by white pitchers. Andersen and
LaCroix, “Customer Discrimination,” also show that there is greater customer discrimination
against the baseball cards of black pitchers in this era. Sundstrom, “Color Line,” and Kahn,
“Discrimination in Professional Sports,” offer more general discussions of discrimination that 
is dependent on the “standing,” visibility, or characteristics of a job.
30
Only black players who had played in the Negro Leagues are included in this analysis, as
those players would have developed skills and training more relevant to a Major League team
than those (very few) black players in this era that had not played in the Negro Leagues. See, for
example, Dodson, “Integration of Negros.”
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estimates of the returns to integration. Previous work has found
little evidence that integration was a function of easily measured
performance features of the teams.31 Table 2 shows the results of a
similar analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazard model to examine
the impact of lagged team productivity factors on the persistence of
segregation. Only one productivity factor had a statistically significant
influence on a team’s integration. When a team was in contention
to win the league in the previous year, that team was statistically
significantly less likely to integrate in two of the three specifications.
This finding implies that the coefficients of a regression of productivity
on integration will be biased in a negative direction, a bias that
works against my findings that Negro League players increased the
productivity of teams.
Tests of Taste-Based Economic Models of Discrimination
To explore the impact of integration on a team’s productivity, I
run regressions of ERP per At Bat and a team’s Wins on the integration
measures and a set of controls. I also include team and year fixed effects
to adjust for any team- or time-specific effects, such as home stadiums
that facilitate scoring or league-wide scoring cycles. The inclusion of
these fixed effects presents some econometric difficulty for estimating
standard errors. To mitigate this problem, I employ a block bootstrap
procedure to determine statistical significance. 32
The results from the productivity regressions show that Negro
League players were a high-productivity option for teams in this
era. Specification I in Table 3 shows the estimates of the impact of
integration on a team’s ERP per At Bat. The coefficient on the dummy
variable indicating whether a team is integrated is both small and
statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the proportion of
a team’s at bats going to a former Negro League player is positive
and statistically significant. This implies that there was little change to
the productivity of a team’s players when a team simply added a former
Negro League player to the roster and he got no at bats. However,
the coefficient for the Share of At Bats given to former Negro League
players shows that a team could have increased its productivity by 2.9

31

Hanssen, “Cost of Discrimination.”
See Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, “How Much Should We Trust,” for a discussion of
the difficulty in estimating difference in difference specifications when the number of groups is
small, and the efficacy and specifics of the block bootstrap procedure in addressing this issue.
32
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TABLE 2
COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACTS OF TEAM
CHARACTERISTICS ON INTEGRATION, HAZARD RATIOS REPORTED
(z-scores in parentheses)
Independent Variables
Log of city population
Share of population that is black
Another team in city?

1-Year lagged ln(attend per game)
1-Year lagged wins
1-Year lagged contend

1 Year
of Lags

2 Years
of Lags

1.0131
(0.02)
0.0013
(–0.96)
4.4838
(1.39)

0.8748
(–0.14)
0.00009
(–1.04)
24.545
(1.50)

0.0779
(–1.05)
3.3 x 10−12
(–1.29)
298.866
(1.56)

1.7486
(0.42)
1.0188
(0.49)
0.1209*
(–1.90)

0.0512
(–1.04)
1.0145
(0.20)
0.0584*
(–1.68)

0.0001
(–1.15)
1.0669
(0.45)
0.0131
(–1.45)

144.19
(1.45)
0.9383
(–0.87)
1.6232
(0.31)

4.3107
(1.52)
0.9992
(–0.01)
0.0283
(–0.97)

2-Year lagged ln(attend per game)
2-Year lagged wins
2-Year lagged contend

3-Year lagged ln(attend per game)

1.3025
(0.07)
0.7784
(–1.36)
0.8929
(–0.05)

3-Year lagged wins
3-Year lagged contend

Log likelihood

3 Years
of Lags

–22.906

–12.039

–8.266

* = Significant at the 10 percent level or better.
Notes: Results are for estimates of Cox Proportional Hazard models with a team’s integration
is defined as the failure time, using the exact partial likelihood method for dealing with
observations with identical failure times. Proportional hazard ratios are reported; therefore
values less than one indicate that an increase in the independent variable decreases the “hazard”
of integrating, and increases the expected duration of segregation, while values greater than one
indicate an increase in the independent variable decreases the expected duration of segregation.
Another team in city? is a dummy variable set to one if a team has a competing Major League
franchise in their MSA, Contend is a dummy variable set to one if a team finished among the
top four teams in their league as measured by wins.
Source: See section “Data.”
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TABLE 3
REGRESSIONS OF TEAM AND PLAYER PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES FOR THE
PERIOD 1947–1961
(t-scores in parentheses)

Independent Variables
Intercept
Integrated?
Share ABs to Neg. Leaguers

Additional controls
Team fixed effects
Year fixed effects
R2
Adjusted R2

Team ERP
per AB
Mean
(mean = .1285)
(Std. Dev.)
[I]
.457
(.499)
.056
(.086)

.1355
–.0002
(–0.08)
.0352**
(2.66)
X
X
X
.5469
.4801

Wins
“Average”
(mean = 77)
[II]
151.5
–.0930
(–0.07)
22.65**
(2.39)
X
X
Not applicable1
.7551
.7356

White Player
ERP per AB
(mean = .1265)
[III]
.1353
.004
(0.87)
–.039
(–0.47)
X
X
X
.6990
.4068

** = Significant at the 5 percent level or better.
1
Year fixed effects are not included in the Wins regression because league-wide wins do not
vary across years.
Notes: T-scores were evaluated using block bootstrapping to account for any cluster effects. For
a more complete description of the block bootstrap procedure and properties in the specific
context of limited clusters, see Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, “How Much Should We
Trust.” Both Integrated and Share ABs to Neg. Leg Players are measures integration; the former
is a dummy variable set to one if a former Negro League player is on the roster, and the latter
relative opportunity afforded Negro League players. Expected Runs Produced (ERP) is a
coworker-independent measure of player productivity as measured by the number of additional
team runs the player generates over an average replacement player (see the section “Data”).
At Bats (AB) are used as a normalizing unit to ensure teams’ productivity is comparable.
Additional controls include Runs Allowed (per At Bat) and Runs -ERP (per At Bat). The ERP
per At Bat regressions include controls to address home field and league-wide characteristics.
The White Player ERP per AB regression is estimated using data up to and including the year of
teams’ initial integrations. This allows for better identification of the reaction to integration, as
opposed to a team’s ability to hire nondiscriminatory players after integration.
Source: See section “Data.”

percent at the mean ERP per at bat if it brought in a Negro League
player and made him a full-time player with one-ninth of the teams
at bats.33 This finding is consistent with the classic Becker prediction
that formerly excluded workers were more productive than the workers
they replaced, and that integration increased the average productivity
of a firm’s workers. Specification II in Table 3 shows the results when
33
Team ERP per AB would have gone down by –0.0002 from just adding the player with no
at bats. The benefit from giving the player one-ninth of all at bats was (1/9)*0.0352, and the
mean ERP per at bat was 0.1285. The percentage increase is [–0.0002 + (1/9)*0.0352]/0.1285.
The calculations for Wins follow the same pattern.
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a team’s wins are used as an alternative measure of productivity. The
relative size and significance of the integration terms’ coefficients in
this regression are similar to those of the individual-level productivity
regression. Integrating with a full-time former Negro League player
would have increased that teams expected wins by 2.42, or 3.15 percent
of the average team’s total productivity. This is further evidence that
the increased individual-level productivity documented in specification
I translated to greater success for the team as a whole. As these results
indicate that a team’s overall productivity rose as more Negro League
labor was utilized more, the challenge now is to understand why
integration proceeded slowly despite these productivity returns.
Considering Coworker Discrimination
Coworker discrimination is notoriously difficult to disentangle from
other types of discrimination. In fact, if coworker discrimination was
prevalent enough, organized workers could have effectively kept owners
from integrating as they had done in numerous unions in the early 1900s. 34
If players were able to convince owners to resist integration, they could
have translated their prejudice into owners’ actions (or inaction). This type
of coworker discrimination would have affected the owners’ extensive
integration decision. As such, only individual coworker discrimination can
be effectively isolated from owner discrimination.
Traditional models of individual coworker discrimination describe a
situation when workers of a particular type have distaste for working
alongside workers of a different type. These models conclude
that favored workers will demand (but not receive) a higher wage
when working with members of the disfavored group. But because of
Major League Baseball’s “reserve clause”—a policy that effectively
indentured a player to his team in perpetuity, so long as the team offered
him at least the league’s minimum salary—players had virtually no
ability to command higher wages. Despite this, some owners expressed
concern that players unable to affect their wages would instead change
effort levels.35
If white players had strong discriminatory attitudes, the introduction
of Negro League players who were taking jobs from whites might have
led to team strife that could have resulted in lower productivity by
the white players on integrated teams. Specification III in Table 3
shows the results of a regression of the ERP per At Bat of White Players
on measures of integration. Note that this regression is estimated using
34
35

See, for example, Fishback, Soft Coal.
Ward and Burns, Baseball.
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data only through the years of each team’s initial integration
to eliminate the impacts of any post-integration changes in team
composition, and better isolate any response to the “shock” of
integration. These results show the productivity of remaining white
players was not substantially affected by the replacement of white
players with former Negro League players. The coefficient of the
presence of any Negro League players is positive, but not statistically
significant. Although the coefficient on the proportion of a team’s at
bats going to former Negro League players is negative, integrating
a full-time former Negro League player reduced average White ERP
per At Bat by only –0.26 percent. This “zero response” can be partially
explained by the fact that former Negro League players were not
typically brought in to replace the lowest-skilled players, but were
more often employed to fill spots vacated by retirement, injury, trades,
or to fulfill specific position needs. Also of note is that there is no
evidence that teams engaged in more frequent trading around the time
of integration in order to remove prejudiced players from their rosters.
While these results provide no evidence to support a hypothesis
of individual-level economic discrimination by Major League players,
they also provide no evidence against more collective coworker efforts
to dissuade owners from integrating. This is probably not surprising,
as any individual who could have been identified as reducing his effort
or output in response to integration would risk immediate replacement.
As such, any manifestation of coworker discrimination was likely a
collective effort to stave off integration.
Testing for Customer Discrimination
Customer discrimination is a particularly important concern in the
context of the baseball industry because the consumer’s evaluation of
baseball involves watching and rooting for the players on a team. Thus,
racial antipathy toward a player likely reduced the interest in a team more
than say the purchase of a product that was produced or sold to the
consumer by a black worker.
The number of fans attending a team’s home games is the measure
used to evaluate customer discrimination. There is a concern with this
simple measure: there is a distinct possibility that the fans who attended
games after integration are not entirely the same fans who attended
before integration. This makes the identification of individual customer
discrimination impossible and raises the possibility that post-integration
customers had a different value for teams. However, net attendance will
reveal if discriminatory fans who stopped attending games were
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outnumbered by the new fans induced by integration. Unfortunately,
there are no available data that will allow for contrasting the value of lost
and gained fans (e.g., relative sales of bleacher tickets versus box seats),
so the “blunt instrument” of total attendance will have to suffice. One
could also be concerned that teams altered their pricing strategies in the
year they integrated in order to induce more fans to attend, but there is no
evidence this occurred. Between 1950 and 1961, the period for which data
are available, teams raised average ticket prices an average of 3.50 times
and by a total of $0.49. Meanwhile, teams that integrated raised prices an
average of 3.58 times and by a total of $0.48.36 Additionally, five of the
12 teams that integrated in these years actually increased their average
ticket prices in the year they integrated, while none decreased their
ticket prices. As such, ticket prices do not appear to have been negatively
influenced by their integration.
Table 4 shows the results of three regressions of teams’ attendances
on measures of integration and other variables. Specification I shows the
results of a specification using only the two measures of integration and
fixed effects for teams and years. The coefficient on the Integrated
dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at better than
the 10 percent level, while the coefficient on the Share of At Bats to
Negro Leaguers is negative but statistically insignificant. The estimated
coefficients show that a team that integrated by adding a former Negro
League player who played full-time would have experienced an increase
in per game attendance of 1,731 (the coefficient for Integrated, 1,746 +
(1/9)*–136.5, the coefficient for Share of At Bats to Former Negro League
Players). This represents an increase of 12.2 percent of the average
team’s attendance. Specification II shows the estimates when covariates
for team productivity, city characteristics, and competition are included in
the regression. The estimates are quite similar to those presented in
specification I. In this specification, the average attendance gain available
through integration with a full-time former Negro Leaguer would have
been 1,974 per game, or 13.9 percent of the average team’s attendance.
However, the effects of integration on attendance likely interacted with
the characteristics of a team’s city, which led me to estimate the model
including the interaction effects in specification III. 37 The estimated
36

House Committee on the Judiciary, Inquiry.
Note that interaction terms for all city and productivity measures are not included. Including
all interaction terms generated substantial multicollinearity problems. Specifically, all interaction
terms’ coefficient estimates had high standard errors, but the F-test of a regression using only these
terms had a p-value of less than .0001. This led me to drop those interaction terms with the most
correlation to the other interaction terms and the highest variance inflation factors. As is common
37

Productivity, Discrimination, and Lost Profits

977

TABLE 4
REGRESSIONS OF PER GAME ATTENDANCE AND PROFIT, 1947–1961
(t-scores in parentheses)

Independent Variables

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Attendance
“Average”
Attendance
(mean=14,175) “Covariates”
[I]
[II]

Integrated? b

.457 1,746
(.499)
(1.85)
.056 –136.5
Share ABs to Neg.
Leaguers
(.086)
(–0.02)
Integration*another
.225
(.418)
team in city?
Integrate*city pop.
1,330,135
(2,372,490)
.519
Another team in city?
(.501)
City population
2,339,790
(2,439,711)
Share of MSA
.086
(.094)
population black
ERP per At Bat
.129
(.013)
Wins
77
(14)
Additional controls
Team fixed effects
Year fixed effects

X
X

R2
Adjusted R2

.5361
.4701

1,644
(1.84)
2,976.8
(0.52)

Attendance
“Interactions”
[III]

Team Profit a
(mean=125.3)
[IV]

2,462**
(2.85)
–224
(0.05)
1,231
(1.12)
–.0011**
(–4.82)
–4,507**
(−4.46)

224.4
(1.51)
845.2
(1.92)
–47.08
(–0.37)
–.000007
(–0.31)
–287.2**
(–3.01)
–.1505
(–1.15)
450,128
(0.40)
–1,470
(–0.47)
9.23**
(2.13)

–3,754**
(–3.53)
–.0006**
(–2.03)
–15,868**
–13,866**
(–2.74)
(–3.04)
2,338
(0.07)
222.7**
(4.72)
X
X
X
.5942
.5302

X
X
X
.7635
.7187

X
X
X
.6098
.4955

** = Significant at the 5 percent level or better (determined using block bootstrapping to account
for any cluster effects on the standard errors—see Table 3 for details).
Notes: All regressions contain fixed effects for Teams and Years to account for team differences
in stadiums and initial fan base and league-wide year differences in attendance. Additional
Controls are the same as in Table 3. A log specification was also estimated, with little qualitative
difference in the results. The “Interactions” specification includes only those interactions listed. A
specification using a full complement of interaction terms was also estimated with very similar
results as those presented.
Source: See section “Data.”

effect of integration is complicated by the inclusion of the interaction
terms. As a first cut, if a team was competing with another team in the
same city and the city population was the league average of 2.3 million
people, integrating with a full-time former Negro League player would
have raised attendance by 7.7 percent. Table 5 provides team-by-team

in the case of collinear regressors, estimates using the full complement of interactions are similar in
magnitude to those presented in Table 5, but with substantially higher standard errors.
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATED ATTENDANCE AND PROFITS AVAILABLE TO TEAMS VIA
INTEGRATION
(standard errors in parentheses)

Team

Per Game Team
Attendance
in 1946

Brooklyn Dodgers

1,797

Cleveland Indians

1,057

St. Louis Browns

526

New York Giants

1,220

Boston Braves

970

Chicago White Sox

983

Philadelphia Athletics

622

Chicago Cubs

1,343

Cincinnati Reds

716

Pittsburgh Pirates

750

St. Louis Cardinals

1,062

Washington Senators

1,027

New York Yankees

2,266

Philadelphia Phillies

1,045

Detroit Tigers

1,723

Boston Red Sox

1,417

Mean (all teams)
Mean (post-1947 delayers)
Mean (post-1950 delayers)

1,158
1,165
1,178

Estimated
Proportion
Change in 1947
Attendance
Available by
Integrating
0.131
(0.066)
0.156
(0.077)
0.507
(0.222)
–0.156
(0.130)
0.279
(0.121)
0.050
(0.132)
0.277
(0.195)
0.037
(0.097)
0.278
(0.113)
0.245
(0.108)
0.251
(0.110)
0.176
(0.079)
–0.084
(0.070)
0.164
(0.116)
0.060
(0.049)
0.191
(0.083)
0.160
0.136
0.150

Years
Segregated
After 1946
0
0
0
2
3
4
6
6
7
7
7
7
8
10
11
12
5.6
6.9
7.7

Average
Annual Profit
Available by
Integrating
($1,000s)
514
(259)
301
(148)
539
(237)
–541
(452)
559
(242)
48
(127)
387
(272)
47
(123)
412
(167)
409
(180)
572
(251)
308
(138)
–548
(458)
334
(235)
154
(127)
563
(243)
254
208
244

Notes: Attendance figures are in thousands of 1950 dollars. Estimated attendance increases
are based on total effects from Table 4. Average annual profits available are calculated using
estimated changes in attendance, the 1950–1961 average ticket prices, concession revenues of
35 percent of ticket price (from Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions), and cost assumptions detailed
in the section “Estimating Owners’ Forgone Profits.” This table is sorted by order of integration
to show the lack of a consistent industry-wide evolution of integration based on profit
incentives. The year 1950 is chosen as an additional comparison year as it is three years after the
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TABLE 5 — continued
success of Brooklyn’s integration, long enough that teams could reasonably have avoided
much of the uncertainty surrounding integration. There is also evidence that the returns to be
made from integration were not exhausted by 1950. Specifically, the Chicago White Sox, the
first team to integrate after 1950, saw their average attendance increase from 9,890 in the year
prior to their integration to 17,028 in their year of integration.
Sources: See the discussion in sections “Data” and “Estimating Owners’ Forgone Profits.”

estimates of the change in attendance that would have been anticipated
had the team integrated in 1947. All of the teams except the New York
Giants and the New York Yankees are predicted to have had positive
attendance gains. Despite the prediction, the New York Giants were
the fourth team to integrated. At the other extreme of the predictions,
the longest holdout to integration (the Boston Red Sox) had one of
the highest projected returns from integration. They also had one of the
lowest levels of profits prior to integration, losing more than $95,000 in
1946. In summary, the vast majority of teams’ attendance predictions are
positive and substantial. This finding is in sharp contrast to a hypothesis
of customer discrimination.
There is one additional measure that might have signaled customer
discrimination to owners of all white teams—the attendance at home
games when an opposing team was integrated. To briefly assess this
possibility, I explore the attendance reactions of the Detroit Tigers
and Boston Red Sox, the last two teams to integrate, to the integrations
of the Philadelphia Athletics, Washington Senators, and New York
Yankees, the three teams that integrated just prior to their integration.
In the year prior to their integrations, attendance at games against
the three soon-to-be-integrated teams was 95.1 percent of the average
home attendance for Detroit and Boston. In the year after integration,
attendance at these games was nearly identical, at 95.3 percent of the
average home attendance. While hardly evidence of the apparently high
latent demand for integrated baseball that existed, these numbers do
nothing to support the idea that fan response to integrated opponents
provided a signal of customer discrimination to Detroit’s and Boston’s
owners.
Estimating Owners’ Foregone Profits
Owner discrimination models are among the most commonly
presumed discrimination models, yet they are perhaps the most difficult
to evaluate due to the absence of direct, quantifiable evidence of owner
utility and/or distaste. But it should be obvious that if the returns
from integration outweigh the owner’s distaste, that owner would choose
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to integrate. Accordingly, in place of a direct analysis of individual owner
preferences, I offer a revealed preference analysis based on estimates
of the forgone profits that could have been achieved had an owner
integrated earlier. As these estimates are of the actual profits forgone
by an owner (not the maximum profits owners might have chosen to
sacrifice), they serve as a lower bound on the level of owner distaste for
integration.38
The estimated annual profits available to each team from integration
are detailed in Table 5. These estimates are obtained by estimating
both the revenues and cost a team would have realized by integrating.
The revenue estimates are simply the estimated attendance gains
from integration multiplied by the average ticket price and concession
income per customer. The ticket price used is the average price for each
franchise over the period 1950–1961, and the concession income is set
to 35 percent of ticket revenues.39
Estimates of the costs associated with integration rely on a number
of available data, including outlays to scout and sign Negro League
players and relative salary effects of these players compared to white
players. These costs are borne solely by the team that integrates, and
not subject to any strategic or external considerations. Two additional
costs, lost stadium rental revenue and decreased relative advantage in
signing prejudiced white players, are shared by all teams when any team
integrates. Many Major League teams earned revenues from renting
their stadium to local Negro League franchises. As each Major League
team’s decision to integrate had an impact on the likelihood of survival
of the Negro Leagues, it would have reduced every team’s expected
stadium rental revenue to teams in those leagues. Similarly, the more
teams that integrated, the lower the expectations young white players
would have had that any organization would remain all white or that
they could avoid playing against black players. As such, each team is
assumed to only have controlled one-sixteenth of both of these costs, as
each of the 16 teams in the league is capable of impacting them.
The costs assumed include per player costs of $10,000 for the
scouting and signing of each player, additional costs of $15,000 in
lost scouting advantage, and $30,000 in lost stadium rental revenue
realized once, when a team initially integrated.40 As former Negro
League players were typically paid less than the players they replaced,
38
Other potential goals of owners (e.g., team performance, attendance) all appear to be
positively correlated with integration. As such, the financial considerations are a lower bound to
the total returns from integration as well.
39
Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions.
40
The cost assumptions rely heavily on the data provided by the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary, Inquiry, and figures reported in Dodson, “Integration.”
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an average payroll decrease of $9,494 relative to the league average
is assumed. This is the average salary change by the eight teams
that reported data on player salaries at the time of their integration
during the 1957 Congressional Hearings. This change in payroll should
include both the salary savings of hiring a low-cost player, and any
increases to compensate discriminating players. However, to ensure
these estimates are conservative, an additional cost of 10 percent of the
average white player salaries on integrated teams is assumed. It should
be noted that there is no evidence of such a response in salaries,
however integrated teams did pay more in bonuses than did all
white teams due largely to improved team performance. Further, there
is no way to isolate any increase in monitoring, for example, higher
managerial salaries to compensate for team chemistry or increased
security costs, from the reported “general operational costs.”
Multiplying the annual profits available through integration by
the number of years a team remained segregated shows the median
Major League team gave up nearly $2.2 million in 1950 dollars
(more than $19 million in 2010 dollars) during the period that they
remained segregated. Although the blocked nature of these data make
the precise level of statistical significance for these results difficult
to establish, most of the estimates have relatively high t-scores. The
average t-score is 1.71. As such, these estimates imply that most teams
could have both yielded high expected profits from integration, and
been fairly confident that integration would indeed be profitable.
These results are robust to the possibility that some teams may
have been risk averse and adopted a “wait and see” attitude towards
integration. When only those teams that remained segregated beyond
1950—when the returns to integration should have been obvious—
are considered, the median team’s lost profits are still more than
$1.2 million in 1950 dollars (over $11 million in 2010 dollars).
These results are also robust to the possibility of discontinuous returns
and assumptions about the owners’ foresight. When early integrators
are dropped from the analysis to account for the possibility they may
have reaped disproportionately high returns, the relevant coefficients
on integration in Tables 3 and 4 remain statistically significant at the 5
percent level, although the profit estimates based on these coefficients
drop by about 15 percent. When the analysis is repeated using data
restricted to only information available in 1950—making the implicit
and strong assumption that owners had no more foresight into the
operations of their teams than the econometrician would have—the
estimated returns to integration are actually higher (although the
standard errors of these estimates are also higher).
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As an additional check on the relative magnitudes of the profit
estimates, Table 4 also includes the results from a regression of
team profits. Unfortunately, data on profits are limited in availability
and subject to more idiosyncratic variability than are the attendance
data. Specifically, measures of profits are only available for the years
1946–1950, and 1952–1955, and are highly volatile due to fluctuations
costs that are independent of integration, such as stadium renovations
or losses incurred by the farm systems.41
Despite these limitations, the profit regression shows general support
of both the direction and magnitude of the estimates in Table 5.
The coefficients on both of the non-interacted integration measures
are positive and large. If a team was competing with another team
in the same city and the city population was the league average of
2.3 million people, integrating with a full-time former Negro League
player would have raised profits by attendance by $254.8 thousand.
This estimated total effect is similar in magnitude to the average annual
profits predicted in Table 5. Some care must be taken in drawing
conclusions from this estimate, however; only the coefficient on the
share of at bats for Negro Leaguers is statistically significant at the 10
percent level, and the t-score for prediction is around 1.40.
Finally, it should not be overlooked that these financial returns are
in addition to the increased wins and the potential for championships
their teams might have achieved through integration. In short, not only
did owners leave a great deal of profit on the table, but they did so by
willingly providing a lower quality product to their customers.
Testing for Statistical Discrimination
While it might seem odd to apply a model of statistical discrimination
to an industry where output and pre-market signals are easily observed,
it is important to note that these models only require that the signals
sent by different groups correlate differently with the productivity, not
that those signals are difficult to observe. These models take the general
form
E

j

| si
j

41

sj

si

(1)

j

A better measure of the impact of integration is the change in a team’s revenues.
Unfortunately, the availability of revenue data is even more limited, and only available for six
teams. For those teams, the average increase in revenues between the two years prior to
integration and the two years after was $381,450 per year, quite similar to the average revenue
increase of $319,000 underlying the calculations in Table 5.
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where E[πi] is worker i’s expected productivity, j is the standard
is the noise associated
deviation of a signal from a j-type workers,
with a worker’s signal, si is the productivity signal sent by worker i, and
sj is the average productivity of a j-type worker.42 In this context of
negligible wage competition, the expected productivity should impact
employment opportunities more than compensation. In other words:
the higher a player’s expected productivity relative to his competition,
the greater the likelihood that player will be given an opportunity to
perform at the Major League level (in all likelihood at a typical rookie’s
salary, regardless of race). As Negro Leaguers had both higher average
productivity and lower wages than their white counterparts, it follows
that the signal strength for these players would have had to be much
lower than that of white players in order for statistical discrimination to
slow the speed of baseball’s integration.
To estimate the predictive strength of pre-market signals on Major
League productivity, I run the following regression separately for white
and former Negro League players
MajorLeagueERP = Xβ +

(2)

where MajorLeagueERP is the measure of productivity, X represents a
set of measured pre-market indicators, and is a stochastic error term.
2
In these regressions, it is the R and not the predicted βs that serves as
2
the appropriate measure of signal strength. As R measure the portion of
the variance in ERP explained by the regressors, it serves as a viable
2

proxy for the

j

term in equation 1.43 Thus, a lower R for Negro

j

League players would be indicative of the lower signal strength required
for a statistical discrimination explanation of baseball’s slow integration.
Table 6 shows the results of different specifications of the signaling
regression expressed in equation 2. I run separate regressions on only
Negro League data, only minor league data, and combined Negro and
minor league data using two sets of pre-market indicators: “traditional”
42
See Aigner and Cain, “Statistical Discrimination,” and Altonji and Blank “Race and
Gender,” for further discussion of statistical discrimination models of this type. See Altonji and
Blank, “Race and Gender”; Levitt “Testing Theories of Discrimination”; and Antonovics,
Arcidiacono, and Walsh, “Games,” for examples of tests for statistical discrimination.
43
Specifically, R 2 can be written as the ratio of explained to total variation, or:
the comparability of this term to

,

the signal weight term in equation 1 is straightforward.
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TABLE 6
RELATIVE SIGNAL STRENGTHS OF PRE-MARKET PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS
2

FOR MAJOR LEAGUE EXPECTED RUNS PRODUCED, AS MEASURED BY R
Negro League
Indicators
Player Group Traditional

Modern

Minor League
Indicators
Traditional

Major League
Indicators

Modern

Traditional

Modern

0.3769
0.5993

0.3763
0.6003

0.3769
0.6883

0.8650
0.6637
0.5980
0.5993

0.7224
0.6797
0.6052
0.6003

0.8668
0.7725
0.7106
0.6883

Comparison of White and Black Player Signals
White players
Black players

0.1388

0.1630

0.3763
0.4728

Evolution of Negro League Player Signal Strength
Pre-1951
Pre-1955
Pre-1959
All data

0.1363
0.2160
0.1283
0.1388

0.1812
0.2185
0.1753
0.1630

0.7748
0.5162
0.4620
0.4728

2

Notes: Dependent Variable = Major League ERP, Output = R . Data used are for white
players who made their Major League debut between 1950 and 1953, and all former Negro
League position players who played in the Major Leagues. “Traditional” indicators include
those commonly known to casual fans, including Hits, Runs, Runs Batted In, and Home Runs,
each adjusted to be per At Bat. “Modern” indicators include Slugging Average (the average
number of bases a player attains per at bat) and a Pseudo ERP measure. Pseudo ERP is identical
to ERP calculated without walks, as data on walks are unavailable for all players in the sample.
However, as the correlation between Major League ERP per AB and Pseudo ERP per AB are
very high (ρ = .8873), Pseudo ERP should be an effective proxy for ERP at the minor and
Negro League levels.
Source: See section “Data.”

measures of a player’s minor league performance that even a casual
fan could have been aware of (hits, runs, home runs, and runs batted in
per at bat rates), and “modern” indicators encompassing the traditional
measures as well as the minor league slugging average (total bases per
at bat) and PseudoERP per at bat (see Table 6 for a description of
PseudoERP). To account for the possibility that teams had to “learn” how
to accurately predict the performance of Negro League players, I also
present results of regressions using cumulative data from progressing
4-year intervals.
2
In each comparable specification, the R for former Negro League
players was actually higher than that of their white counterparts, opposite
the result predicted by statistical discrimination. There is also no evidence
of a “learning curve” in predicting the performance of former Negro
2
League players. In fact, the R for former Negro League players is higher
when the analysis is restricted to early integrators. This is less surprising
than it might first appear. As early integrators were able to select from
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the entire distribution of Negro League players, they could choose not
just the best players, but also those who were most likely to succeed.
Regardless, these findings are in such sharp contrast to the hypothesis
of statistical discrimination they may imply that alternative forms
of discrimination were stronger. By promoting a white minor leaguer
in place of a former Negro Leaguer, owners actually decreased
their expected payoffs and exposed themselves to increased risk. As
such, the alternative forms of discrimination needed to exceed both the
productivity advantage and the informational advantage former Negro
League players possessed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This article examines the sources and magnitude of economic
discrimination that slowed the integration of Major League Baseball.
Customer, individual-level coworker, and statistical discrimination do not
appear to have impacted this market. Only owner hesitancy can explain
the delay of integration in Major League Baseball; however, this hesitancy
might not be the sole result of owner discrimination. If discriminating
players convinced owners they were all (or at least predominantly)
unwilling to play on an integrated team, then the resulting segregation
would be indistinguishable from owner discrimination. Just as important
as the source of the discrimination is its cost; the median team sacrificed
an estimated $2.2 million in 1950 dollars (more than $19 million in 2010
dollars) to delay integration. But, the incentives to integrate were too large
for discrimination to win out forever, and each team eventually integrated
(despite few changes in ownership).
The finding that owners or collectives of players may have
been responsible for the economic discrimination that manifested in
this market is probably not surprising to those familiar with this era
and industry. What is perhaps more surprising is the finding that
individual coworker, customer, and statistical discrimination did not
appear to significantly impact this market. This could be the result of
the industry’s structure. Because labor and consumers in the industry
had little market power, the impact their individual prejudices could
have been limited.
These findings have implications well beyond the baseball industry.
Baseball’s integration was a historically significant event, and may
yield insight into the more general labor market discrimination at play in
this era. Though the baseball industry was a relatively small industry,
its integration was a nationally salient event that influenced the integration
of many other industries and institutions. Additionally, since baseball
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was a noncompetitive industry, the discrimination documented here could
yield insight into the average level of discriminatory preferences in the
larger market.44 Finally, baseball’s visibility also meant owners could hide
neither their discriminatory hiring nor the negative impact it had on the
quality of their product from their consumers.
44

Becker, Economics of Discrimination, p. 47.
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